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Abstract: The paper considers the status of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the light of the new 
Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and of the present internal state of the European Union. Even if in 
theory the ENP could have been a valid substitute for enlargement, it does not seem to have reached its 
aim of providing an adequate surrogate for full membership. Considering the figures of the new Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013, the issue of market access, and the internal power dynamics of the EU, we see 
that it is hardly conceivable that the ENP could ever give to its neighbours the same economic advantages 
that membership  gives to the poorer members  of the EU. Another controversial aspect is the clear 
asymmetric  nature  of  the  ENP,  whereby  the  payoff  for  neighbours  is  conditioned  on  their  “good 
behaviour”, thus amounting to a form of soft imperialism. While ENP tries to establish a comprehensive 
and  coherent  framework  of  the  EU’s  relations  with  its  neighbourhood,  the  actual  behaviour  of  EU 
towards its neighbours is shown to present some inconsistences due to political expedience and pragmatic 
concerns.  The  consideration  of  some  related  basic  issues  of  EU  institutional  reform,  such  as  the 
weakening of the powers of the member states, or the introduction of some intermediate forms of partial 
membership,  concludes the paper. 
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1.  Prodi’s promise 
1.1 Introduction 
Facing  the  greatest  enlargement  of  its  history  (in  terms  of  the  number  of 
countries, territory, and population), and a possibly long interruption of the enlargement 
process, the EU launched in 2003 the European Neighbourhood Policy (henceforth 
ENP) in order to furnish to its new neighbours of the East, left outside of immediate, 
or any, prospects of enlargement, some compensation and a kind of comprehensive 
framework for their relations with the EU, which could apply also to the neighbours (or 
alleged neighbours) of the South.
2 Presenting the basic philosophy of ENP in 2002 
President Prodi made the famous promise: “everything but institutions.”
3 The promise 
                                                 
1 Some of the views presented here were originally contained in a short report to the conference on The 
Challenges of European Neighbourhood Policy. Rome, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26-27 November 2004 
(Chilosi, 2004). Thanks are particularly due to Michael Keren and Susan Senior Nello for comments and 
suggestions leading to improvement of the paper, but also to Annalisa Meloni and Marcello Di Filippo 
for  discussing  specific  related  arguments.  None  of  the  above  persons  should  however  be  held 
responsible for and remaining mistakes and controversial views. Email: chilosi@sp.unipi.it 
2  The  relevant  EU  documents  related  to  ENP  are  listed  and  made  available  at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm. For a recent general survey of ENP and of its 
economic implications see Dodini, Fantini (2006). 
3 Cf. Prodi (2002).   
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refers  to  the  possibility  for  neighbours  to  have  the  same  treatment  and  economic 
advantages of EU membership, except the participation in EU institutions, through a 
process of gradual adaptation to EU’s membership requirements. Has Prodi’s promise 
been fulfilled, or is it going to be fulfilled? We believe it has not, nor is it likely to be. 
Considering the figures of the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the issue of market 
access, and the internal power dynamics of the EU, we see that it is hardly conceivable 
that  the  ENP  would  ever  give  in  practice  to  its  neighbours,  notwithstanding  the 
theoretical possibility, the same economic advantages that membership offers to the 
poorer members of the EU, at least until when, if ever, the EU radically changes its 
decision making mechanisms.  
1.2  Economic  advantages  for  neighbours  of  “Everything  but 
Institutions”  
Let us consider now what are the advantages of membership and how non-
members  could  share  them.  Considering  the  economic  aspects  only,  the  main 
advantages are three: The first refers to the creation of public goods, such as standards 
and norms, that can benefit economic activity, notably trade (not only with the EU), 
through  predictability  and  uniformity.  This  can  benefit  non-members  provided  they 
accept those standards and norms,
4 but does not require in principle a specially devised 
Neighbourhood Policy (no  more than the non-participation in the European Monetary 
Union may hinder countries outside the EU from adopting the euro as a legal tender).
5 
The EU does not hold a copyright on its legislation and can only be happy if anybody 
else decides to mirror it.
6 However, neighbours cannot take part in the process in which 
these norms and regulations are established, and these standards are devised, even if 
they can in principle influence the agreements that can be reached in the framework of 
the  international  organizations  to  which  they  may  belong,  which  may  constrain  the 
establishment of those standards and regulations.
7 Still EU legislation creates standards 
                                                 
4 Moreover there are some good reasons for a neighbouring country to acquire at least those parts of the 
acquis concerning standards and regulations (chapter 1), which are instrumental in having her wares 
accepted without fuss in the EU markets, as well as those favouring investment from EU countries (in 
particular chapter 5, concerning company laws). One could also consider the saving in legislative time 
and resources needed to prepare their own legislation, even if in turn adaptation of existing legislation to 
the acquis requires legislative time and resources. This applies in particular to those transitional and 
developing countries that are in the process of transforming their legal system anyway. However the 
acquis reflects the needs and opportunities of prosperous advanced economies and it may be hardly 
compatible with the different economic and social structure of more backward poorer economies. In 
particular  one  may  doubt  that  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements,  facilitating  mutual  trade,  could  be 
possible between countries at very different levels of technological and economic development. This 
presents a challenge both in the perspective of membership and in that of participating to the single 
market and the EEA (European Economic Area). In the end, as often is the case in economic matters 
(and not only in those), it is just an issue of trade offs, and the balance of costs and benefits depends on 
the specific circumstances, but especially on the possible response of the EU. 
5 As in the notable case of Montenegro. 
6 The same applies with respect to human rights, democracy, protection of minorities, establishment of a 
functioning market economy, in short all the Copenhagen criteria. 
7 Of course neighbouring countries can attempt to influence the decisional processes inside the EU by 
representing their specific interests and concerns, but this can be effected in the usual framework of 
diplomatic representations or of agreements concerning bilateral relations. The ENP as such does not 
innovate  in  this  respect,  as  it  would,  say,  if  it  were  to  bring  about  a  multilateral  forum  in  which 
neighbours could collectively influence EU’s decisional processes.  
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for its neighbours, what in itself amounts to a public good. The neighbourhood policy 
includes  an  operational  structure  for  assisting  the  neighbours  (as  the EU does with 
candidates) that can facilitate the adoption of EU standards and regulations. This could 
be of some help for trade, especially by improving the opportunity for access to EU 
market through elimination, in particular, of the technical barriers to trade.  
The  second  possible  advantage  refers  to  the  net  benefit  (that  is,  net  of 
contribution to the EU budget) of aid and financial assistance to the poorer members of 
the  Union.  This  kind  of  assistance  would  certainly  be  provided  to  neighbouring 
countries if they were to be admitted to the EU (with the possible exception of Israel, 
since it is much better off than the others).
8 The third benefit refers to the possibility of 
integration between neighbours’ and EU markets (“a stake in the Internal Market”), as 
characterized by the four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital).  In  turn  harmonization  of  legislation  and  market  access  could  bring  the 
additional  benefit  of  stimulating  foreign  direct  investment.  This  has  performed  an 
important role in the progress of the economies of Central European new members as 
well as of the more backward EU economies in the past.
9 As we shall see, on the issue 
of aid and of market access the promise has not been fulfilled, and possibly could never 
be,  at  least  to  a  degree  that  would  be  equivalent,  even  if  only  in  perspective,  to 
membership. It is true that in theory assistance to a relatively poor neighbour could be 
provided in the same amount and according to similar modalities as assistance to a 
relatively poor member, and an analogous consideration can be made with respect to the 
opening up of the internal market to neighbours. But this is quite unlikely in practice 
because of political economy considerations related to the way the internal dynamics of 
the EU does operate.
10 
2.   Aid and assistance.  
Let us start with aid, and make some elementary calculations, on the basis of the 
Financial Perspective for the years 2007-2013.
11 What do the poorer insiders (and in 
particular the new EU members) and the even poorer neighbours get in the framework 
of the present Financial Perspective? Some simple figures suffice to give the overall 
picture.
12 The appropriation for the ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument) for the present Financial Perspective is €11.967 billion (down from the 
€14.929  billion  initially  proposed)
13,  only  slightly  more  than  the  Pre-Accession 
Instrument (€11.565 billion). Here one can already perceive the much lower financial 
effort of the EU towards its poorer non-candidate neighbours (“the countries of the 
                                                 
8 Somebody unacquainted with EU mores could be puzzled at the idea of Israel as a neighbour, since it 
does not have a common border with the EU. But for the purpose of neighbourhood policy countries 
that  are  separated  from  EU  borders  by  a  stretch  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  are  also  considered  as 
neighbours.  Even  the  countries  of  the  Southern  Caucasus  are  included  in  the  ENP,  even  if  they 
certainly are not neighbours in the geographical sense of having a common border with the EU.  
9 On this point see Milcher, Slay (2005). 
10 Cf. Baldwin, Wyplosz (2004),  ch. 3, pp. 73 f. On the limitations to the prospect of the EU opening up 
its market to its neighbours in the areas where they are most able to compete (which often are the 
sensitive areas where the EU has lost its competitive advantage) see Milcher, Slay (2005). 
11 Truly speaking Prodi did not explicitly mention aid in his speech, but aid is for the poorer members an 
important advantage of EU membership. 
12 Cf. EU (2006). 
13 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2004).  
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south and eastern Mediterranean, the Western NIS and the countries of the southern 
Caucasus”)  than  towards  candidate  countries  (Croatia  and  Turkey)  or  potential 
candidate  (the  countries of Western  Balkans),
14  considering  the  smaller  number  and 
disproportionately lower population of the latter groups.
15 But the difference becomes 
really  impressive  if  one  considers  the  shares  of  the  budget  earmarked  for  cohesion 
(€308.041 billion) and for CAP (now prudishly renamed “Preservation and Management 
of Natural Resources”: 371.344) that really dwarf the ENPI. Of course members, unlike 
neighbours, contribute to financing those programmes. Let us consider therefore the net 
EU budgetary contributions in favour of the four  poorest EU (15) members in 2003 
(the data for the year 2004 are in principle less relevant because of the accession of the 
new  10  members  in  mid  year,  but  in  reality  they  are  not  much  different,  indeed 
somewhat higher on the whole, for the four countries concerned).
16 In the single year 
2003  only  the  net  contributions  (in  terms  of  effective  expenditure  and  receipts) 
amounted to €3.3617b(illion) for Greece, €8.7065b for Spain, €3.4754b for Portugal, 
€1.560b for Ireland (not any longer among the poor, but still treated as such). Adding 
up  we  obtain  €17.102b,  markedly  more  than  the  amount  earmarked  for  the 
neighbourhood policy for the whole seven years period of the Financial Perspective. If 
we also consider the much larger population and poorer conditions of the neighbours, 
presumably in greater need of assistance, in relation to that of the EU (15) poorest four, 
the disproportion becomes really impressive.
17 Moreover the appropriation for the ENP 
includes  funds  for  regional  cooperation  which  will  be  spent  in  a  yet  undetermined 
proportion inside the EU, and, of the total appropriation for the ENPI, more than half 
is  foreseen  to  be  actually  spent  in  the  year  2013  and  later.
18  Similar,  if  somewhat 
attenuated, considerations apply to the year 2005, when the net contribution of the EU 
budget to the net recipient countries was €17.501 billion (of which 13.433 were allotted 
to the old four net recipients and 4.069 to the new ten ones).
19 Going into detail, and 
considering the extent of net transfers in per capita terms, one is left with an astonishing 
                                                 
14 In principle the ENPI refers to following countries (the figures between brackets refer to millions of 
population):  Algeria  (32),  Belarus  (10),  Egypt  (76),  Israel  (6),  Jordan  (6),  Lebanon  (4),  Libya  (6), 
Moldova (4), Morocco (32), Palestinian Authority (4), Syria (18), Tunisia (10), Ukraine (48), Armenia (3), 
Azerbaijan (8) Georgia (5) and Russia (144). Russia however has not accepted, for prestige reasons, the 
ENP framework, but rather a so-called Strategic Partnership that in practice amounts more or less to 
the same (in the sense that it is for Russia to adapt to EU rules and regulations rather than the other way 
round). The candidate (2) and potential candidate (5) countries are: Croatia (4), Turkey (69); Bosnia (4), 
Serbia and Montenegro (11, but recently separated), Albania (4), Macedonia (2). 
15 Among the neighbours, however, one country is not poor (Israel), and others (Belarus, Lybia or Syria) 
are not really actively involved with the ENP because of (possibly contingent) political reasons. They 
could become involved, even deeply involved, if the political obstacles are overcome. 
16 Cf. European Commission (2005), p. 142. 
17 Of course there may be the issue of the possible different degree of absorptive capacity, but it seems 
difficult that this difference may compensate the difference in the degree of financial commitments. 
18 Cf. Commission of the European Communities (2004), p. 36. To make the comparison between the 
financial assistance to neighbours and present poorer member fairer, one should consider that assistance 
by the EU is only a part of overall development assistance neighbours receive, and one may well assume 
that in case a neighbour were to become a member of EU, the sources of assistance outside the EU 
could dry up. (The data on Official Development Aid can be found  in the OECD site at 
http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,2578,en_2649_34447_25602317_1_1_1_1,00.html.) 
19 Cf. European Commission (2006), p. 138.   
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difference between the assistance provided to the four older members and that to the 
new poorer ones (see table 1 on the next page).
20  
The obvious explanation lies in the fact that assistance to new members was 
decided when they were still outside the EU
21 and their clout in the internal dynamics of 
EU decisions was limited. Moreover, enlargement, as one would have expected of any 
decision taken at unanimity, tends to happen according to a Pareto-like principle, by 
which  there  cannot  be  losers,  including  the  previous  net  beneficiaries  from  EU 
contributions,  contrary  to  what  equity  and  good  common  sense  may  suggest.
22 
According to the logic of Prodi’s argument (“the quality of our relations with them will 
largely depend on their performance and the political will on either side”) one could not 
justify the different treatment, since the neighbours were so close to the EU that they 
could even be admitted into the Club. On the other hand, one may expect that the 
contribution in favour of the new members will increase in time, both because of their 
coming of age as insiders into the power dynamics of the EU, and because of the 
gradual adaptation during the present financial perspective of the agricultural handouts, 
from 25%, in 2004, up to 100%, in 2013, of those applying to the countries of the “old 
Europe”.
23 
                                                 
20 One may be struck in particular by the following cases: the Czek Republic vs. Greece, countries of same 
population  size  and  not  too  different  per  capita  incomes,  and  Poland  and  Spain,  countries  of 
comparable  size,  but  with  very  unequal  treatment  as  far  as  financial  assistance  is  concerned.  The 
relatively high net per capita transfer to Malta, and to a lesser extent to the Baltic countries and Cyprus,  
among the “New Europe” countries, may be partly explained by the fact that there seems to be some 
tendency for smaller countries to benefit of higher net per capita contributions (this suffers however 
some exception: see in particular, among the “old” European ones, the comparison between Greece and 
Portugal). As to the overall  relation between per capita income and assistance, a straightforward inverse 
relationship (which should lead to direct resources where they are possibly more needed and effective in 
reducing inequalities) finds a theoretical limitation in the so-called “absorption problem” that has led to 
the rule stated in the Berlin Agreement (1999) of limiting the transfers of structural funds to a maximum 
of 4% of GDP of the recipient country. The practical limitation however lies not only in the factual 
“absorption problem”, which affects the concrete capability of countries to spend effectively, but even 
more in the complex internal dynamics of the EU, in the reluctance of existing recipients to give up the 
transfers of which they are beneficiaries, together with the refusal of EU members to accept an increase 
in their contributions to EU budget. (“All EU politicians claim to be for enlargement, but they also say 
in unison that somebody else should pay for it: the current net beneficiaries argue that they cannot be 
asked to accept less because it would be unfair to finance enlargement by cutting transfers to the poor. 
The current net contributors argue that their populations will simply not accept any increase in their 
transfers to the EU budget”,  Gros, 2004, p. 5.) In 2005 the size of structural of funds expenditures as a 
percentage  of  GNI  was  on  average  0,30%,  ranging  from  a  minimum  of  0,05%  in  the  case  of  
Luxemburg to a maximum of 1,98% in case of Portugal (European Commission, 2006, table 1c, p. 108), 
far below the theoretical ceiling. For the new members the figure varied from 0,07% (for Cyprus) up to 
0,78%, in the case of Lithuania. Even at these low levels there have been problems of absorption, 
attributed in particular to poor administration capabilities (cf. World Bank, 2006). 
21 At the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council (cf. Senior Nello, 2005, p. 427). 
22 It cannot be exaggerated the damning consequences of a Pareto-like principle for the ability to reach 
collective decisions, and for the span of economic policy itself. One may simply reflect how much 
would decisions be constrained inside a national economy if any intervention were to require  that 
nobody were to be worse off.  
23 Ibidem, p. 425.  
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Table 1: Per capita contributions to net recipient countries 200524 
Country  Population
1 
PPP per 
capita 
income US 
$
1 
Net per capita 
contribution 
from EU 
budget 
(Euros)2 
Net 
contribution 
as a percentage 
of GNI
2 
New Europe 
Latvia  2306306  13200  114  2,09% 
Poland  38626349  13300  48  0,80% 
Lithuania  3607899  13700  132  2,35% 
Slovakia  5423567  16100  50  0,73% 
Hungary  10032375  16300  59  0,72% 
Estonia  1341664  16700  115  1,54% 
Czek Rep.  10246178  19500  17  0,19% 
Malta  396851  19900  227  2,07% 
Cyprus  775927  21500  116  0,69% 
Slovenia  2011473  21600  50  0,37% 
TOTAL  74768589    51
3  0,76
3 
Old Europe 
Portugal  10524145  19300  225  1,64% 
Greece  10647529  22200  366  2,19% 
Spain  40280780  25500  149  0,68% 
Ireland  3969558  41000  286  0,83% 
TOTAL  65422012    205
3  1,00%
3 
1From CIA (2005). 2European Commission, (2006), p. 138.  3Calculated from the data provided in European 
Commission (2006). 
 
On the basis of the above figures one may appreciate the much lower degree of 
consideration for the interests of neighbours than for the interests of members and, to a 
lesser extent, prospective members. Thus it is obvious that on this account alone the 
neighbourhood  policy  (as  well  as  the  economic  assistance  to  potential  candidates) 
cannot really reduce the drive of neighbouring European countries towards possible 
accession, except for a radical, but quite improbable, change of perspective.  
3.   Market access.  
What about the main aspect of Prodi’s promise: the stake in the EU internal 
market? Part of the difficulties may lie in the adaptation of the neighbours to internal 
market requirements. This may be rendered relatively more difficult since EU financial 
aid for assistance in law-making and administrative reform to the willing neighbours 
would be lower, owing to the overall amounts involved, than for the candidate and 
                                                 
24 The data reported in the table are net per capita contributions, this means the difference between what 
a country receives per capita from EU budget and the amount that it does pay into it. The countries that 
are listed are those that are net recipients, this means those for whom the difference is positive. For all 
the others the difference is negative.  
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potential candidate countries. However the neighbours really keen to adapt their own 
legislation completely to the EU’s may not be so many. But the main issue here is that 
one would hardly expect the EU to open up its market completely in the more sensitive 
areas, where most of its neighbours could better compete, in particular agriculture,
25 
over and above what would be required in an eventual  conclusion of the Doha WTO 
round, however unlikely this has by now become.
26 Only in case of entry into the EU 
would the access to the internal market be necessarily complete. The arrangement for 
market  access  that  Prodi  had  in  mind  when  launching  the  ENP,  and  to  which  he 
explicitly referred, was the European Economic Area (EEA). The latter however does 
not necessarily imply complete integration in the EU market, insofar the EEA is a Free 
Trade Area and not a Customs Union. This entails the need to refer constantly in trade 
to rules of origin. In the specific case of EEA “the rules concerning processing of 
products and documentation of the origin of products are simplified” and, considering 
customs  cooperation  and  simplified  formalities  “manufacturers  in  EFTA  countries 
operate under approximately the same conditions as manufacturers in the EU”,
 27 but 
this  cannot  be  generalized  to  different  contexts,  involving  less  advanced  countries. 
Moreover, even if the EEA implies a deep integration with EU in a number of areas 
(among others services and public procurements, and free movement of capital and 
labour)
28  the  free  trade  area  is  not  all  comprehensive.  In  particular,  agriculture  and 
fisheries are in principle excluded. A relevant consideration, relating to the issue of the 
previous section, is that the three EFTA EEA countries are net contributors to the EU 
budget, while the neighbours are in general net recipients of aid, and they would be 
much more so in case of equal treatment with EU poorer members (“everything but 
institutions”). Turkey has a customs union with the EU, but here too the customs union 
is highly incomplete, since, in particular, it does not include agricultural products, where 
Turkey  should  have  a  comparative  advantage,  nor  services,  and  the  EU  can  block 
alleged destabilizing imports through antidumping clauses.
29 The advantage of a free 
trade area is that, unlike a customs union, it allows members to enter independently into 
other similar arrangements. This is of particular importance in the case of our Eastern 
neighbours (first of all the Ukraine), because a possible entry into a free trade area with 
the EU does not exclude the possibility of a similar arrangement with Russia; however 
the rules of origin implied by a free trade area can be pretty onerous.
30 
A general difficulty in an EEA type of arrangement is the need to adapt almost 
automatically to the changing EU legislation relating to the single market. In case of 
                                                 
25 See on this point Grabbe (2004). 
26 Indeed the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreements that regulate the economic relations of 
the  EU  with  its  Eastern  neighbours  “are  little  but  codification  of  WTO  principles  for  non-WTO 
members.” (Aaslund, Warner, 2004, quoted in Milcher, Slay, 2005, p.9.) 
27 Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1995). For the discipline concerning rules of origin and 
cumulation in the EEA, see EEA Agreement (2007). 
28 Integration extends to the areas of enhanced cooperation, such as, for Norway, Schengen cooperation 
and the Dublin convention (relating to the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers). 
29 For a detailed analysis of the customs union agreement between the EU and Turkey, see Kabaalioglu 
(1996).  
30 See Shumylo (2006), p. 10.  By late Russia seems to  have become rather impatient with Ukraine’s 
attempts  not  to  compromise  its  possibilities  of  integration  with  the  EU,  pushing  instead  Ukraine, 
though the leverage of its energy dependency, towards the construction of a Single Economic Space 
(with Russia Belarus and Kazakhstan), and, in the meantime, towards a customs union, which would be 
incompatible with a free trade area arrangement with the EU (see Jamestown Foundation, 2006).  
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membership,  EU  legislation  would  automatically  apply  (aside  from  the  internal 
legislative adaptations that are anyway due). In case of EFTA countries that are EEA 
members,  adaptation  is  practically  immediate,  but  the  procedure  is  somewhat 
cumbersome  and  does  not  seem  likely  that  it  could  be  easily  repeated  with  other 
neighbours. From the point of view of national politics the need of almost automatically 
adapting  to  a  legislation  with  no  share  in  its  production,  and  with  no  prospect  of 
entering the Union and of eventually sharing decision-making powers (such as it would 
certainly be the case with the countries defined as non-European) could be seen as hard 
to swallow. Finally, of the four liberties, the one concerning the movement of people 
would be particularly problematic. In the recent enlargement it has been limited, but 
only  temporarily.  But  even  such  an  arrangement  would  hardly  be  conceivable  with 
respect  to  the  poorer,  and  demographically  much  more  important,  neighbours.  An 
arrangement allowing free movement, even delayed in time, would be hardly possible 
because  of  its  destabilizing  effect  on  the  EU,  owing  to  the  massive  movements  of 
population it would entail, and would be politically unfeasible. In the end, what seems a 
more likely approach with neighbours is, rather than the EEA model, a more symmetric 
one,  based  on  a  free  trade  area,  possibly  with  the  extension  to  all  neighbourhood 
countries of the Pan European Cumulation System.
31 As we have already seen in the 
case  of  the  Ukraine,  an  additional  advantage  besides  symmetry  is  pluralism:  the 
possibility for neighbours of entering an additional free trade areas besides the EU. In 
the end the access to the internal market depends on the meeting of two wills: the will 
of the EU of going against internal organized sectoral interests opposing free trade, and 
the  will  of  neighbours  to  adapt.  Both  are  probably  harder  to  come  by,  unless  the 
prospect of membership is in sight. 
4.   The European Neighbourhood Policy as soft imperialism 
What is particularly striking of the ENP is its asymmetric aspect. It is for the 
neighbours to adapt to the values and relevant legal production of the EU, not vice-
versa. Even if the relative size of EU and neighbours, and the fact that EU rules must  
already have been agreed through a complex procedure involving its 27 members, make 
as a matter of fact unilateral adaptation to its rules by neighbours a foregone conclusion, 
this  asymmetric  approach  could  not  be  well  received  everywhere,  especially  where 
nationalist pride is particularly strong. This is basically the reason why Russia, a proud 
country of imperial past, 
32 has not agreed to this approach, even if in practice in the 
economic  relations  with  the  EU  it  is  for  Russia  to  adapt  to  EU  standards  and 
regulations, rather then the other way round.
33 But even if the asymmetry in the relation 
between the EU and its neighbours is a fact of life, to stress the asymmetric character of 
                                                 
31 For the latter, as presently applied to EEA and Mediterranean neighbours,  see European Commission 
(2007). 
32 And, one must add, with geopolitical ambitions out of tune with its economic size and institutional 
strength: even if in the present moment of high energy prices Russia tends to translate its market power 
as an energy supplier into political power, the overall PPP size of the Russian economy is estimated at 
about the same as Italy’s, and a sixth of China 
at: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html  
33 However “Russia is unhappy about the EU demanding that Russia adopt its norms and rules, even 
though Russia does not intend to join the EU, no one is waiting for it there and its problems cannot be 
solved within this structure” (Kulikova, 2004). Instead of the Neighbourhod Policy there is the notion 
of a Common European Economic Space, which is a rather hazy and undetermined concept. For a 
concise but sharp discussion see Pursiainen (2004a). See also, Pursiainen (2004b).  
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it in the explicit formulation of a comprehensive policy instrument may seem rather 
impolitical.  Candidate  countries  must  adapt  too,  but  the  overall  perspective  is 
completely  different:  adaptation  is  the  price  to  be  admitted  to  the  Club,  where  in 
principle  all  members  have  equal  dignity  and  partake  of  decision-making  powers, 
according to statutory rules. With neighbourhood policy no co-decision-making powers 
are envisaged.
34 As to the EEA setup, on which the ENP was modelled, a basic political 
difference lies in the fact that admission to the EU for EFTA countries was, and still is, 
available, but was voluntarily declined.  
In a sense the ENP approach can be seen as part of the drive of the West 
towards the Rest for  exporting as superior its own institutional and cultural model, 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, the market, which is reflected, among others, 
in  the  creation  of  the  post-war  international  institutions  (starting  with  the  United 
Nations). Aside from the conviction of having the “right model” that should be spread 
in the interest of everybody concerned, this kind of soft imperialism may be seen as 
partly dictated by the selfish interest to survive and continue to prosper. Eventually, the 
Rest  (in  particular  the  East)  will  be  inevitably  ahead  of  the  West  economically  and 
militarily, not only demographically. Only the absorption by the Rest of the values and 
institutions of the West can allow for the West a destiny of quietly merging with a kind 
of multiplication of itself. To some such a kind of soft imperialism with a bend for 
natural  law  may  appear  abstract  and  antihistorical,  insofar  as  it  does  not  take  into 
consideration the specificity of actual situations, differences in historical background, 
particularities and possibilities, and does not respect alternative views and systems of 
organization. In particular, western liberalism is basically intolerant of intolerance, while 
the latter is unfortunately widespread in many quarters of the world, as always in history 
has been the case.  
In  practice,  in  the  actual  behaviour  of  EU  relations  with  its  neighbours  the 
theoretical principles are forcibly bent and adapted to concrete situations, as much so as 
to  lead  to  a  lack  of  coherence  between  practice  and  theory.  As  an  example  let  us 
consider two parallel cases of the economic relations of the EU towards two neighbours 
that have some interesting aspects in common, Tunisia and Belarus. Both countries, of 
analogous size, are ruled by autocratic presidents. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of 
Tunisia appears no less autocratic than President Lukaszenko of Belarus, and possibly 
more, if as a rough index of autocracy we take the percentage of votes attributed in 
presidential elections (Ben Ali 94.48% in October 2004; Lukaszenko 85% in 2001).
35 
Both presidents enjoyed constitutional referenda allowing them to continue their office 
after reaching the maximum number of mandates allowed by the Constitution (Ben Ali 
in 2002, Lukaszenko in 2004). The reaction of the EU has been quite different: the 
freezing since 1996 of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus may be 
contrasted  with  Tunisia’s  continuous  enjoyment  of  an  Association  Agreement.  The 
different reaction of the EU could be explained by the fact that what may seem normal 
for an African country, albeit relatively better educated (literacy rate 74.2%), such as 
Tunisia, may seem less natural in a well educated (literacy rate 99.6%) European country 
                                                 
34  One  must  note  however  that  unilateral  approximation  is  already  required  in  the  framework  of 
Association Agreements for countries that have no perspective to join the EU. See for instance art. 40 
and 52 of the 1998 EU-Tunisia Association Agreement. 
35 Data taken from Wikipedia, and BBC country profiles 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles).  
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such as Belarus.
36 Moreover there is the issue of the outside option. As far as Belarus is 
concerned, one could hardly expect any other alternative set-up but some kind of liberal 
democracy.  For Arab countries  such  as Tunisia,  the dreaded  alternative could  is  an 
Islamic regime. On the other hand the regime of Belarus too seems to be conservative 
rather  than  expansionistic
37  (such  as  instead  one  may  perceive  the  present  trend  of 
Putin’s Russia to be), and as such does not seem to put the interests of the EU at risk. 
Albeit  authoritarian  and  repressive,  Belarus  is  still  a  neighbour  with  whom  the  EU 
shares a border and relevant security interests. To aid and help it (such as the EU has 
done with the Tunisian regime) would be excessive, but to deal with it without specific 
and  emphasized  sanctions  could  be  more  appropriate,
38  and  perhaps  even  more 
conducive to a change of regime if it were to bring about a softening of its propensities 
for retrenchment.
39 
5.   Some institutional issues 
In order to overcome the difficulties of getting more neighbours as members 
into the EU a more limited form of membership has been proposed.
40 One could also 
envisage  a  kind  of  enhanced  neighbourhood  à  la  carte.  For  instance, Turkey, whose 
prospective full membership raises so many perplexities for political and demographic 
reasons, could be admitted to take part, of the three pillars, only in the single market, 
with full decisional status in relation to economic issues only. Of the four freedoms the 
one relating to free movement of people could be denied, and not only, as in the case of 
the  recent  enlargement,  as  a  temporary  measure.  A  progressively  more  extended 
membership could follow Turkey’s progress, if any, in the relevant areas. But this may 
be  seen  as  politically  unpalatable.  As  a  more  far-reaching  and  plausible  solution  an 
alternative  membership  with  more  limited  powers  should  be  envisaged  for  all  the 
members,  as  the  extent  of  the  present  rights  of  any  individual  member  could  be 
incompatible not only with further enlargement, but with the progress, and indeed with 
the continuous smooth functioning of the European Union.
41 This applies in particular 
                                                 
36 For some more articulated data on the levels of educational attainment, see the ILO database (ILO, 
2003, in particular table A2). 
37 Authoritarian regimes that are conservative rather than expansionistic (say, Egypt, Tunisia or even 
Belarus) do not pose as such a threat to peaceful coexistence, while authoritarian regimes that are 
expansionistic (such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or present day Iran) do, as do regimes that because of 
their repressive behaviour or ineffective governance push their citizens into mass emigration. One may 
add however that there have also been plenty of examples of expansionistic democracies, putting the 
stability and integrity neighbours, and even of distant nations, at risk. Democracy, unfortunately, is no 
absolute guarantee of peaceful restraint. 
38 As an example of collaboration between Belarus and its western neighbours one may refer to the 
Söderköping process, the objective of which is “To address the cross-border co-operation issues arising 
with the EU enlargement eastwards and to promote dialogue on asylum and irregular migration issues 
among the countries situated along the EU eastern border” (cf. http://soderkoping.org.ua/).  
39 Castro’s Cuba is a blatant case of an authoritarian long surviving regime, notwithstanding harsh political 
and economic sanctions by the US, including a trade embargo, leading to retrenchment rather than 
collapse.  
40 Cf. Economist, (2005). 
41 As an instance of the obnoxious enactment of unanimity and implied veto powers, one may mention in 
the past enlargement the stubborn requirement by Greece of admission to the EU of the divided (and 
geographically Asian) island of Cyprus. In order not to rock the whole enlargement procedure Cyprus 
was admitted, hoping that in the process it would re-unite, avoiding at the same time making  of re-
unification a requirement for admission. The result has been the internalization into the EU of the  
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to voting and blocking rights, and to the practical right of not being sanctioned for non-
compliance to membership obligations (even the theoretical sanctions for violating the 
Maastricht conditions have been practically ineffective, as experience has proved; at any 
rate the sanctioning system is weakened by the condition that the prescribed fines must 
indeed be paid by the offending parties, and it is unclear what would happen in case of 
non-compliance).
42 As to the suspension of a EU member, the condition of unanimity at 
some point in the procedure (maintained in the failed Constitutional Treaty) seems to 
render  any  such  comprehensive  sanction  highly  improbable.
43  A  more  subtle  and 
flexible  system  of  sanctions  is  needed,  such  as  for  instance  it  would  be  an  almost 
automatic exclusion from the relevant European decisional bodies in case of important 
violation  of  some  aspects  of  the  Treaty.  For  instance,  the  countries  violating  the 
Maastricht conditions, so long as the violation lasts, could be excluded from the meeting 
of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, and from the decision-making 
processes relating to economic matters, or their voting powers could be taken away or 
reduced,  unless,  say,  a  qualified  majority  of  the  European  Council  decides  to  the 
contrary. Countries not abiding by community regulations concerning, say, agricultural 
matters, such as in the case of Italy’s handling of the milk quotas, could be excluded 
from  the  meetings  of  the  agricultural  ministers  and  from  decisions  concerning 
agriculture. Some reduction or suspension of payments from the EU budget could be 
also  envisaged.  Analogous  measures  could  be  applied  in  regard  to  other  important 
violations in other areas. Whenever possible the violation should be declared by a non-
political body such as the European Court of Justice, or, perhaps, by a qualified majority 
of  the  European  Parliament.  Moreover  the  stage  prescribed  by  art.  7(2)  in  the 
suspension procedure should require a qualified majority rather than unanimity. If the 
sanctioning and excluding system is more effective, new members can be admitted more 
wholeheartedly, with less danger that a change in their internal setup may eventually 
rock the Union through stubborn and reckless use of veto powers. Moreover, if the 
power of any single member is accordingly reduced, membership itself could become 
something less of an issue. But will the egotism of the old nation states ever be able to 
suffer such a sizable reduction in their cherished prerogatives? 
44 
                                                                                                                                          
unresolved issue of the status of Cyprus, complicating the already complicated relation with Turkey (in a 
sense Cyprus admission functions as a kind poison pill in EU-Turkey negotiations). 
42 See art. 104 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. (The text of the founding EU treaties and 
other  fundamental  EU  documents,  including  the  proposed  Constitution,  can  be  accessed  at  < 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/index.htm>). 
43 Cf. art. 7 of The Treaty on European Union, concerning suspension of “certain of the rights deriving 
from the application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting rights of the 
representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.” 
44 Even if the project of the new European Constitution has been, at least momentarily shelved, obviously 
the reform process of EU institutions will not stop here, owing to the need of reform induced, in 
particular, by the enlarged membership. It may be maintained that even if the European Constitution 
were ratified, the reforms in the decisional process would have been insufficient for guaranteeing a 
satisfactory functioning of the EU with the new membership, and moreover that the sanctions foreseen 
for lack of compliancy to the rules by member states would have continued to be utterly inadequate. 
(For a theoretical analysis of the much greater difficulty of reaching decisions with the new membership, 
and of the issue of the voting rules, see Baldwin, Wyplosz, 2004, pp. 84-86.) One may also add that 
decision making could be rendered more difficult by the greater heterogeneity of the Union after the 
enlargement, as indicated  by the much greater disparity in per capita incomes than under previous 
enlargements, with possible greater heterogeneity of preferences between the member states. But the 
issue of deepening vs. widening, where the latter is considered to be better compatible with maintaining  
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In the meantime, in the enlightened interest of the EU itself, neighbours (and in 
particular Turkey that already has an incomplete customs union with the EU, as well as 
long-standing and frustrated membership aspirations) should be granted the maximum 
access to the EU market, up to possible complete integration. The latter implies in turn 
the willingness of neighbours to open up completely their markets and to adapt their 
relevant legislation to that of the EU, as well as by the EU countries to renounce the 
defence  of  their  non-competitive  sectors,  first  of  all  agriculture.  While  the  first 
conditions may be willingly accepted by some neighbours, given the internal dynamics 
of the EU and the power of concentrated interests it could be difficult to bring about 
the second, notwithstanding Prodi’s promise, and the fact that increased trade and the 
phasing out the protection and subsidisation, in particular, of EU agriculture, would be 
in  the  best  overall  interest  of  EU  members  themselves.  But  EU’s  effective 
developments may eventually dispel the seemingly most realistic pessimism, and prove it 
as unrealistic, as has been the case many times in the past. The European Community 
has  always  survived  its  direst  critical  moments  and  most  dramatic  crises,  and  the 
movement towards European integration, as well as its enlargement, has up to now 
continuously progressed, even through stop and go movements. Obviously the most 
recent stop have been the French and Dutch referenda. But if we extrapolate what has 
happened in the past, eventually the movement towards EU integration, and perhaps 
even enlargement, should resume. Thus there is matter for hope, at least for those, as 
the present writer, who see the process of European integration in a positive light. 
                                                                                                                                          
the sovereign powers of the component nation states, is an old, even if perhaps somewhat misleading 
one, since the wider the membership the greater the supranational powers required to keep the Union 
together and to ensure the fulfilment of its functions, however limited they be, and the lesser the power 
of any single state to influence EU decisions.  
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